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Introduction 
An outstanding feature of the analysis of civil wars is the information management and 
its effects locally
1
. The confrontation between enemy troops regularly proceeded by 
intelligence operations. With qualified informants to give details that reduce risks. 
Although information is a key to understanding life in a locality usually it is used to 
recognize important aspects of economic resources, contracts, and investment officials. 
The information has also served to find profiles of the population and characteristics of 
the positions of power in government, its scope and limits. In addiction conflict agents 
use information they can get to impose on the population norms, habits of conduct, 
threats, punishments, culminating in killings and massacres. 
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Nevertheless the theme of the strategic roles of information and rumor in areas under 
paramilitary or insurgent influence suggests several questions: What role has the 
information in the landscape of struggle for power in local areas?, How information 
flows in contexts conflict over political power, and what characterizes the information 
in areas of paramilitary or guerrilla influence are, who are responsible for the 
information, and what types of acts arising from the information, how to have 
developed so-called " blacklists?, how does the sound derived from the information, and 
what kind of information promotes the values at locations under the authority of violent 
armed agents how to run the information "down" "up and back ?
2
. 
Provided along with the deployment of various strategic assault tactics, escalation of 
violent actions in taking over villages and the fear imposed by the targeted killings, 
routine tasks also arise to collect information in areas under the influence of different 
fronts, paramilitary insurgents, compile data and selecting names and characteristics of 
potential victims (enemies of the cause), informants or in some cases, strategic targets 
had to be used selectively for the sole purpose of expelling the "opposite"
3
. 
During the recent period of events and actions of the Colombian armed conflict have 
been many changes in strategic matters. Both with respect to the dynamics of 
withdrawal and military coups against as FARC, the ELN organic derangement, and the 
impact they have had negotiations with the AUC or paramilitaries. In relation to these 
groups, the logic of their strategic dominance displays by the territorial and local 
government in the regions is clear with the upcoming elections of mayors, governors 
and councilors, as derived from the information given by means of opinion and analysts. 
But also part of the crossroads of the ongoing negotiations will depend on what might 
happen with the political and military power they have achieved over a quarter century 
                                                          
2
 These questions require the analyst a mandatory condition of comparative research on theories of 
conflict. In addition to suggesting also that the mainstream media have a function that can help to rise 
concerns at the community level and should serve as a bridge to protect them. These are questions that 
require advanced work in the complex web of interests in contention for the local political power. 
3
 The phenomena of information and rumor in strategic areas and territories are not a new topic in the 
historical context of armed conflict and violence in Colombia. Mary Roland, professor of Latin American 
history at Amherst College in Massachusetts and Cornell University, New York, has documented these 
events with evidence of local order in the case of the violence that marked the regional identity of 
Antioquia: A sangre y fuego, la violencia en Antioquia, Colombia, Instituto Colombiano de Antropología 
e Historia & Fundación para la Promoción de la Ciencia y la Tecnología, Bogotá, Colombia, 435 pp. In 
contemporary political theory, stands the study by Robert Nozick on the preparatory conditions on a 
conception of the State neocontractualism. These conditions are defined by the phenomena described 
below. In that sense, this test can be judged as a continuation of the hypotheses suggested by Nozick, 
Anarquía, Estado y Utopía,  published by Fondo de Cultura Economica, translated by Rolando Tamayo, 
First reprint, Mexico, 1990, 333 pp. See an interpretation of the concept of "minimal state" and 
"Protection Agency" in the recent article "Estado mínimo, agencias de protección y control territorial”. 
Revista Análisis Político, Universidad Nacional de Colombia. Bogotá, Colombia, S.A:, v.56, p.115 - 131, 
2006.   
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local paramilitaries. Any time is evidence of the failure of the military logistics to flood 
the territory abandoned by these violent groups and overt signs of municipalities and 
towns that live under the conditions of an anomic state
4
. 
Although reports suggest that the territories "abandoned" by the paramilitary groups are 
being covered by emerging: In the southwest of Antioquia are the 'Aguilas Negras', in 
the municipalities of Salgar, Titiribi, Santa Barbara and Amagá. 'Rene', a 'to' runaway 
Ralito, is one of their leaders. In Salgar, in the village of Las Margaritas, police shot 
dead six armed men wearing armbands of a group called the Protection of Farmers, 
CAP. In the northeast, in former zone of 'Macaco', has denounced the presence of 60 to 
70 men of the 'Central Bolívar'. Uraba is present in groups of demobilized 'Elmer 
Cardenas' and the band led by 'HH'. Also in Santander, according to the Ombudsman, a 
group of demobilized paramilitaries in Puerto Boyaca and the 'Central Bolívar' created 
'The Eagles'. Engaged in drug trafficking and theft of Ecopetrol pipeline. In Cauca, 
armed groups caused a shift in two villages of Roncesvalles, 'Taps' and 'Stubble', the 
armies of the Norte of Valle cartel, is presented as paramilitaries. This has been 
extended to Chocó and Nariño. In Caldas the 'Cacique Pipintá', a group of 'Ernesto 
Báez', not demobilized. See it is estimated that between 30 and 60 'emerging bands' 
arising from groups paramilitaries demobilized 
Because deep down is not only to legitimize actions that undermined the government's 
institutional presence, but the very existence of the state is questioned. In some regions 
as demonstrated in earlier studies, local experienced what Robert Nozick described 
under conditions precedent to the formation of the State: entire communities living 
under the control and intimidation of private protection agencies (paramilitary or 
guerrillas) and that does not find how long is something that could be the "State"
5
. 
Although the cases of explosive bombs in large and medium cities, collective 
kidnappings by armed groups, represent just a sampling of how the violent armed 
conflict has decisively taken a course where they are open predominating intelligence 
work and handling information as strategic weapons
6
. But the demonstrations in favor 
of revealing a detailed understanding of the contexts of paramilitary and insurgent 
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 El Tiempo, diciembre 10/2006.  
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 Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, New York, Basic Books, 1974). However, serious 
dilemmas of detail and state presence in many localities should not detract forces a received view about 
the legitimacy of democratic institutions in Colombia. The theoretical problems - arising from the 
empirical debate on the various forms of state-building in Colombia are an issue too dense to be treated in 
this paragraph. References to Nozick‟s analytical categories to address the context of our armed conflict 
are limited resources. In the sense that do exist raise identifiable forms of political and military power in 
the Colombian case reproducing substantive aspects of the theoretical framework nozickiano. 1988). 
6
 Santos Juliá (ed.), Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Victimas de la guerra civil", Madrid: Temas de Hoy, 1999. 
Estrada, Fernando,  Metáforas de una Guerra perpetua, Estudios de pragmática del discurso en el 
conflicto armado en Colombia, Fondo Editorial Universidad EAFIT, 2004, 173 pp. 
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political influence, the handling of contracts in areas as necessary for the population as 
health and education, and the scandals caused by the ties of the political class in 
departments Atlantic Coast as Sucre, are events that are defining today decisively the 
Colombian armed conflict
7
. 
In summa, in the context of these strategies by the local and regional power bets violent 
actors are at a key moment. Following the agreements of Santa Fe de Ralito and events 
have occurred in the illegal negotiations with the paramilitary groups have dispersed 
heterogeneous in regional locations, and reports show a volume of violence on the part 
of strategic resources drug cartels, paramilitary and insurgency, this kind of violence 
more directly to citizens, as in the case of targeted killings, abductions, extortion, 
increased threats and threaten
8
. Not only-but also in areas under paramilitary or guerrilla 
influence what we have in terms of Clausewitz might be termed "a rise of extremes". 
Rather, the concentration of forces of violent groups has given way to a kind of 
naturalization of armed conflict. In addition a proliferation of effects of violent conflict 
by careful selection of victims and information resources available on a ladder in each 
locality
9
. 
In synthesis the sources of information, building networks of informants and local 
intelligence work have become targets of paramount importance in the calculations of 
political power of the paramilitaries and insurgents. The top-down relationships 
between commanders and irregular troops, and horizontal direct participation of the 
affected population, are now processed through an extensive strategic game that relates 
political wrangling and feelings (hatred, jealousy, revenge). Above all the elections of 
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 “Peor que el 8000” Revista Semana Nº 1280, 2006.,  “… y esto apenas comienza”, Revista Semana, Nº 
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governors, mayors, councilmen and members are subject to the power interests of the 
agents of violence. So it is possible to notice, with variants of the case that the irregular 
election cycles that have prevailed in recent decades, will be present at the election of 
mayors, governors and councilors in 2007. 
Furthermore, the phenomena of information and rumor can offer us for this very central 
aspect to comprehend the march of events we have in political life in the local context. 
In what follows, this paper proposes the following basic next target: 1) To illustrate how 
information operates within the terms of a slaughter, (2) What aspects of intra changes 
reveals information circulating by violent actors (3) The type of relations that produces 
asymmetric information at the local community (4) how information is identified in the 
context of local political conflict identity structure of populations and their forms of 
political power 
In sum, the text introduces a phenomenological analysis of information (deviations) to 
understand the dynamics of local conflict. More or less information or limited 
information can be derived for the case of populations where they are active agents of 
conflict, more or less retaliation. 
However, this supports the author is that information becomes a key tool for 
understanding key aspects of strategic type by warfare agents, are the tools of the 
networks of informants who have the warriors and politicians to prove their greater 
penetration ability and intelligence against their enemies. 
 
The information and the informant 
An everyday scene of a community besieged by armed conflict is enough to illustrate 
the scope of the accusation against the inhabitants of a population, the scope of 
information and rumor in the hands of an informant. For this purpose, the events 
occurred in the village of Chengue (Montes de Maria, Sucre)
10
. We will take this case 
because it has the ingredients of the analysis are proposed: 
Although all have that with a list of informants were calling about 40 people by their 
first name and the brave gathered in the main square [1]. Before the terrified eyes of his 
countrymen, 25 men were killed in an awful way [2]. Those with better luck dry shot in 
the head [3] and others were beheaded with machetes, as if they were pigs [4]. Everyone 
saw the carnage of the people [5], and not worth the pleas of parents, sons and brothers 
to respect their family life [6]. The uniformed executioners [7] finished their slaughter, 
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burned 30 houses [8], explained that his action sought to clear the area of guerrillas [9], 
took hostage 10 farmers [10] and left as quickly and noisily Chengue [11 ] as they had 
arrived two hours before [12]
11
. 
Nevertheless, the description that communicates the event is framed in a complex 
common strategy with violent actors by the local political power. The event marks a 
symbolic ritual components and machinery of fear and war gear, including weapons 
stab household. The assembled audience is broad: the entire population. Closed all 
entrances and exits, one has no escape. It is about getting an assertion of power that can 
be witnessed by men, women and children. The general context of the story is perceived 
as passing off background details. And the conditions of place are crucial [1]. 
The story places emphasis on "looking terrified" of the peasantry. Rate and describes the 
act [2]. Compare and refers to the "luck", the death rate of victims [3]. Identify the 
instruments of harm as part of the gravity of grief that will cause [4], and makes an 
analogy with the vulgar sense of horror [4]. The background narrative is familiar and 
close to all [5]. And the type is covered in similar language to highlight the comparative 
degrees alienate these humans from domestic animals slaughtered for the table. They 
move things and people to an impregnable target. 
In particular, the context of the criminal action reflects little respect for religious 
symbols and expressions. The slaughter has components of paganism. And does not 
support place for other forms of expression outside the same barbarism [6]. Also care 
little prayers or prayers from the blood ties between families. Similarly, a local tragedy 
in Colombia can be viewed with the characters of a power that nothing will work 
without limit, as the power used by Creon in times of Classical Greece. The clothing of 
the attackers is stored as a sign of a massacre evidence [7]. And the fire that burns is an 
integrated element of terror to signals that the perpetrators wanted to plant on victims 
[8]. 
Also the reasons given by officers to commit the violent slaughter of rhetoric have a 
weak character. In addition, to using a metaphor of war in use, the need to "debug", 
"disinfect", "clear the area of guerrilla influence
12
. In reality it is an explanation in 
euphemistic terms about the reasons for the action [9] which appeals to the general 
discourse of orders from "above". "Down" death and barbarism, "up" ambiguous 
justification in a unit of information learned. And after withdrawal [10] creating an 
agonizing uncertainty. With the fold-out, the hallmark of who are the sole authors of the 
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assassination? Finally, the witness reports the time course of the tragedy [11] in a tone 
which, though not in-intentioned, makes the sharpness of the comparison [12]
13
. 
In sum, this action includes globally what could be called a typology of territorial 
control and the strategy for taking the local power
14
. But common aspects of the stage, 
actors, victims and all the scenery of the horror caused to the population. Although no 
explicit mention in the text, presumably the list with the names of the accused by 
informants, the event tells the thunderous arrival of criminals, the location of victims, 
and the public notice in the main square of the population. In conclusion the deliberate 
act of killing without showing hatred, calculating the damage to be caused to the 
victims, the impression that the witnesses should be present. Many more details in this 
passage can be made "visible" events, not enough to cover its total cruelty. 
The conflict in regions and municipalities has reflected many scenes of this kind
15
. If it 
can be of any value taxonomy and computational technology resources are used to 
classify the victims. But if war makes innocent dead, dead "guilty" may also have 
become victims through the murky information that accused them of being "enemies". 
And for every victim in war is always "guilty enemy. Really, innocent or guilty, many 
victims of the conflict emerge as an indirect effect of information networks and 
informants who complete listings filed in books or in electronic memory. In the 
paramilitary slaughter of the Barge, the people gathered by the murderers saw with 
horror that the commander opened his laptop and began to call by name the victims
16
. 
This phenomenology of violent confrontation also shows how the facts of the conflict 
are increasingly dependent on how information circulates locally
17
. 
Therefore, in war as in everyday life information has decisively to mobilize person and 
collective actions. A slight change, a slight distortion of the messages may have 
unfortunate consequences, how does the information among contender‟s conflict? How 
is acquired and information circulates in the conflict zones. What kind of issues 
presented information? What do the dynamics of information within communities 
affected by war? What operating relationships between information and violence that 
top-down work? 
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More important for the question that interests us here to discuss, how it distorts the 
sound information, What is going from rumor to information?, Rumor How can become 
a powerful instrument of harm?
18
. 
 
Rumor and violence among the community 
To introduce the analysis of this problem is a hypothesis based on variant key 
information
19
. The hypothesis is that in any of these domains (conflict or everyday life) 
the sound corresponds to a kind of politically directed behavior. That rumor is installed 
noise phenomena such information and has a rational purpose in his sources deliberately 
designed to cause damage against an opponent. 
Also in conflict zones the rumor spread prejudices are faced before by interpersonal 
clashes, jealousy, envy and hatred. And it allows level of public discourse and projects 
these negative emotions without direct inclusion of those who experience it. In others 
words, the rumor meets cycle‟s plot, where each cycle adds or adds some agreement 
with the very interests of those involved
20
. A fireball initially takes the strength of the 
evidence supporting it.  Consolidating an important factor unsettling to the victims and 
preparing the coup de grace. Kalyvas this aspect is emphasized in the following terms: 
 
Many of the detailed descriptions of violence suggest the presence of significant supply 
and local initiatives in the production its. Instead of being imposed on communities by 
outsiders, this evidence suggests that violence often (but not always) grows from within 
the community even though it is run by outsiders, it is in other words, intimate
21
. 
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Salazar, “Rationality, Preferences and Irregular War”, en Colombian Journal of Economics, 2003. 
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21
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The rumor among community survives among truthful information and lies to be one or 
the other depends on conditions of stability or instability deliberative social context 
where people are immersed. There are intra-prone conditions the effects of noise, and in 
such conditions the emotions of the people (or physical danger) becomes more 
vulnerable
22
. The rumor is not clear, usually hides his primary sources, and involves a 
degree of ambiguity rather lax as detracting from direct responsibility to stakeholders by 
circulating. Nobody knows for sure who said it. The noise carries harmless to begin 
with, because apparently a comment that another does not cause damage. It may seem 
an innocent game, but in areas of armed conflict takes on a huge force with serious 
consequences
23
. 
We can compare it to an image. The information circulating locally preserves all 
components of a system where they are distributed for internal communication lines. 
The sensors of the network represent basic units of speech that can go in different 
directions with specificity. Sensor information locally is an agent that recognizes 
behavior, speech acts, i.e., different modes of communication, which is able to 
distinguish other agents with different names and signs. In a local population may be 
noted, for most cases, that information circulating on people tends to be deterministic, 
as suggested by the following graph: 
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23
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Colombiano de Antropología e Historia, 2002. 
11 
 
 
Adaptation of: Efficient adaptive dispensing, against omission failures, Darek Kowalski Michałł 
Strojnowski 
The features condensed by this image - network helps us understand that the distribution 
may keep certain levels of balance.  
 
 
Asymmetrical nature of the information 
For information and rumor in conflict zones, however, we can hardly play a decisive 
nature of it. It is not a closed system, but in the context of open systems. Among other 
things, the informant is related to bullying strategies and tactics to counter enemy 
action. More specifically, the information is useful for selecting those for whom it is 
presumed to potential enemies. So be declared as "military targets"
24
. As a preliminary 
to obtaining information, the informant provides care to the rumor; it begins as 
questionable information that runs from side to side without showing someone who 
supports their content. However, it can have a much more effective persuasive force, as 
symbolically threatens danger lurking from the uncertainty
25
. 
A feature of the information circulating in these areas is, in principle, its confidential 
nature and, so, it is distributed asymmetrically among political actors and civilians
26
. 
                                                          
24
 Original agent rumor, occasionally suffer from mood effects suspected that "there are" enemies around. 
Such states of suspicion spread like material support to the rumor, and serve as a vehicle in interpersonal 
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 It should be stressed that the rumor is part of a family of communication phenomena of parasitic 
character. Close to gossip, slander and calumny.  
26
 On the asymmetrical nature of the information, we have complex evidence upon which one can see 
how victims (almost always) the last to be aware of the plot that is woven over them. The data, names, 
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Hence, its primary character of the commentary comes regularly surface. Circle with 
emphasis depending on the degree of harm that is intended to cause, the sound is 
projected to cause the expected impact. In truth, under conditions of uncertainty 
populations besieged by violent actors are exposed to be psychologically affected by the 
rumor of a possible slaughter. In the background, the agents of violence can access the 
information through the fear in exceptional cases, but usually is to infiltrate some 
members in intelligence work for the people's spontaneous information
27
. 
And answer questions, such as, how they carried out the kidnapping collective action in 
the building in Neiva, to illustrate just one case, is to rediscover a whole wide web of 
interrelationships between informants, military intelligence and political projection on 
the scope of action. To detect movements, positions available, acquire data of residents 
and specify the conditions on the day and time of the operation, previously required 
very precise tactical dispositions. This implies that in war, violent acts can not be 
separated from the structure of intelligence operations prior to go with them. It is 
important to consider incentives and rational expectations of people and communities, 
both in regard to those who have power in the area and their potential enemies. 
Empirically the progress of the war in different populations of the disputed territory, 
shows how communities have been fragmented, in, i.e., the effect of the imbalances 
created by intimidation and terror, communities are prone to a social environment 
mistrust and division. It is not unitary actors that can take uniform measures against 
their enemies (although we have exceptions), it is rather clear that: (1) The actions of 
actors dispersed over particular areas of interest and projects of the population, (2) 
Violence generated enmity among themselves for their own people from the same 
community
28
. 
In the context of a strategic confrontation to the dominance of an area between the 
guerrillas or paramilitaries, information and rumors are instrumentality to classify 
                                                                                                                                                                          
addresses, family, work and relationships, are obtained without much difficulty. This intersection of 
information in many cases has had the cooperation of local authorities. In the Colombian conflict 
panoptic vision of the perpetrators, is easily documentable. Perhaps because the most powerful metaphor 
for this phenomenon was written in a literary chronicle insurmountable: García Márquez, Gabriel, 
Crónica de una muerte anunciada, México, editorial Diana, 1989. 
27
 Aronson, Elliot, Age of Propaganda. The everyday use and abuse of persuasion, Nueva York, W.H. 
Freeman & Co., 1992 ( La era de la propaganda. Uso y abuso de la persuasión, Barcelona, Paidós, 
1992); Pizarro Quintero, A., Historia de la Propaganda. Notas para un estudio de la propaganda 
política y de guerra, Madrid, Eudema, 1990. (2ª ed., 1993)  Kaldor, Mary, The new wars. Organized 
violence in the global era, New York, MIT Press, 2001. 
28
 Barnet, F.R.S., (eds.) Political Warfare and Psychological Operations. Rethinking the US Approach 
Washington D.C., National Defense University Press, 1989. 
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bipolar "friends" and "enemies"
29
. Where once coexisted in different forms of exchange 
and partnership, is the mistrust and opportunism, the bonds of solidarity are lost, the 
dynamics between intimidation and fear that is displayed in the same communication 
between the various members of the community
30
. But the composition of the violence 
in the disputed area and comes in two types of transactions or commitments on the one 
hand the agents 'external' (both insurgents and paramilitaries, as political actors in the 
exercise of power), and on the other, the agents 'internal' (civilian informants, 
militiamen, ordinary people of the locality). The interaction of these exogenous and 
endogenous agents violence occurs selectively on the basis of information obtained
31
. 
The information, as rumor circulating regularly in conflict zones is intended to 
denounce, and complaints stem from all kinds of local conflicts: private nature only 
(recurring enmity family), or local reflexes of a lawsuit more scale (a conflict between 
Indians and farmers). Complaints can be linked to the conflict (the opponents by a 
dispute over land, can be aligned in opposing political camps), and can be generated in 
the conflict itself (the political actors can invest resources in a given community) and 
cause competition with their opponents)
32
. 
So how it becomes Kalyvas describes the complex phenomena of intimidation, fear and 
denunciation in the dynamics within the community: 
 
The complaint not only provides benefits, it also carries significant costs. Individuals 
who are willing to denounce their neighbors will almost always only when the benefits 
of action outweigh the costs involved there. Because of the enormous difficulty that 
carries its analysis to anthropologists and historians have overlooked the calculations of 
the complainants (potential) part of the phenomenon of violence. The main complaint is 
the cost of the risk of future punishments that meet the complainant
33
. 
 
Occasionally the complaint is motivated by the genuine support a political actor (the 
case of militia), we have a claim on his "pure" state. But most of the time the complaints 
                                                          
29
 Ignatieff, Michael. Guerra virtual. Más allá de Kosovo. Editorial, Editorial Paidós, Barcelona. 
Traductor, Francisco Beltrán Adell, 195 pp. 
30
 Álvarez, Gardeazabal, Gustavo, Cóndores no se entierran todos los días, Bogotá, Ancora editores, 
1971. Una mirada a la donación de Botero al Museo Nacional de Bogotá: Botero, Fernando. "Con dolor 
de patria", en Revista Diners, marzo del 2001, pág. 24. 
31
 Alfredo Molano: De Llano llano, Siguiendo el corte, Llano adentro, Rebusque mayor, aguas arriba, 
trochas y fusiles. Todas publicadas por el Áncora Editores, Bogotá.    
32
 Kalyvas, Stathis N., “La violencia en medio de la guerra civil”, Óp. Cit. 3-25. 
33
 Ídem, p.18 
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are motivated by selfish interests, the selfish, the result of an interest in solving personal 
vendettas (complaint maliciously). In these cases, the information and rumor play a role 
in denouncing the war parasitic, who reveals, has the intent to cause harm to the 
accused
34
. 
Provide the information circulating as rumor is an expansive image that comes basically 
as empirical phenomena from elementary dialogue between two, and that is assuming 
increasing leadership through concatenated nodes. Note that the links created by the 
sound each one of the neighborhoods include potential expansion into an adjacent area 
in a direction oriented. Added to this is the time, that in the empirical cases studied to 
conflict zones, it can take only a few hours or days. The image allows us to appreciate 
these aspects quite simple: 
 
Adaptation of: Efficient adaptive dispensing, against omission failures, Darek Kowalski Michałł 
Strojnowsk 
 
Also people are often willing to denounce their neighbors to get benefits or protection 
and security. A complaint can take another path, once it clears the form of the rumor 
("say", "some say", "There is said"). The opportunity created by the rumor is the 
opportunity for the settling of accounts of small altercations or discrepancies. But the 
                                                          
34
 The roads "intermediate" which runs through the eye provide a vague rumor about the intentions of the 
agent of violence. As can be corroborated, in civil wars, often camouflage the real objectives through 
political discourse learned (sometimes from memory.) Down (between the lines) we find the desire for 
personal revenge, grudges Crusaders, jealousy and envy. While "Up" is touting great causes. Only when 
we read in hobessian key conflict in Colombia, sufficient care should be given to rational adaptation 
processes with this voluntarism apparently operating blind beast warrior. As he does see the study of 
Gutiérrez Sanín, Francisco, La ciudad representada, políticas y conflicto en Bogotá, TM Editores, 1998.  
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results can have unfortunate consequences. For this reason, this network of units they 
move the information and reporting, are interwoven personal and collective interests, 
the former are related perks he receives complaint, in the second case, the strategic 
mobilization of terror carried signs to intimidate who are close to the victims
35
. 
Information units correlated with the rumor always run under conditions not fully 
developed. Thus, a node that has key information can potentially be related to strategic 
points in the network to be responsible for reproducing the information in adjacent 
areas. In fact, the specific information is not unidirectional. Viewed in another way, 
what we have in the structure is an interactive relationship with obvious flaws: gaps, 
distortion or instances of network drives that behave indifferent. 
The key to interpreting the phenomenology of paramilitary massacres like the barrel of 
the ticks or the Playon de Orozco, a village lost in the middle of the Magdalena 
department, we find, not only in military-style strategic moves, but in the targeted work 
search information and tracking details from informants. One of the most explicit was 
the slaughter committed by the paramilitaries in The Gabarra, Tibu, Nort de Santander. 
Chacon Edison reporter makes use of an owner taking the exact words of the 
commander criminal: "From here it does not move anyone. With a greeting among the 
terrified villagers in fear: "Put on some music this holiday is just beginning”36. 
The following figure illustrates a model could use as information channels between 
members of the civilian population and violent actors. 
                                                          
35
 The set reproduces almost all the critical aspects of the impact of misinformation and rumor in conflict 
zones. On one hand, the strategic fields of territorial dominance and the advancing of the troops on the 
territories they fear being abandoned by the inhabitants of places. Moreover, the exchange of sets of 
rational complex conflict that is having an imitation processes and surprise. And finally, the subject we 
have addressed the mechanisms and impacts of information and rumor. Information as cohesive unit 
becomes a rumor spread that results in proliferation of ambiguous effects strategically exploited by the 
agents of violence.  
   
36
 San Jose del Palmar, Chocó, was the scene of fierce fighting between the FARC and a newly developed 
self-defense group in Risaralda. In this particular case were subjected populations in strict compliance 
with all sorts of intimidation by the different fronts in confrontation. See: “Muerte en el cañón de las 
Garrapatas”, Revista Semana, Octubre 31 de 2005. 
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Adaptation of: Efficient adaptive dispensing, against omission failures, Darek Kowalski Michałł 
Strojnowsk 
 
However, this is one of the most complex problems in this negotiation with the 
paramilitaries. Their assets are precisely the most desirable fertile land and strategic 
sites who have taken in their outreach activities and military dominance. It is complex 
because these lands have been for the last two decades also the main object of poppy 
and coca, and camps have served as laboratories for drug processing. The return of these 
lands and, so, the destruction of one of the most profitable economic sources of drug 
traffickers and paramilitaries is still a headache for those who are negotiating the 
reintegration of these groups
37
. 
The sound and the claim can be inferred under uncertainty, when agents of violence do 
not have the time to corroborate the data collected, the rumor is taken as information. 
It's the right occasion, reporting personal enemies as a cause or political actors 
themselves assume all costs of risk. In many cases, violence excuse. The scene of 
conflict becomes dense, hidden under the shadows of anonymity to the complainant. It 
is paid and provided with advanced weapons to an army of mercenaries to liquidate the 
enemies or making a profit on property and land
38
. 
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 Uribe, María Teresa: "Los materiales de la memoria". En: La investigación cualitativa. Editado por: 
ICFES (Instituto colombiano para el fomento de la educación superior) e INER (Instituto de Estudios 
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 Paul Collier y Anke Hoeffler, Greed and grievance in civil war, Centre for Study of American 
Economics Working Paper Series, 2002. María del Pilar Castillo y Boris Salazar. “Guerra Irregular, 
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This combination of complex interests in confrontation, conscious and unconscious 
affects people who undergo this way to a private power to make sure their integrity
39
. 
Kalyvas said: "The State is given in concession, as it were, to people in the region, who 
use their newly acquired power to pursue their personal interests and settle old scores." 
Many cases of violence that apparently (and outside observers) seem to originate from 
purely political or ideological motivations, do or not, after a thorough examination turn 
out to be "caused not by political or ideological issues, but by personal hatreds, revenge 
or jealousy." 
 
Conclusion 
In Colombia, the escalation of armed confrontation and the increasing inclusion of 
civilians by the agents of violence has created a personalization of the conflict, ie the 
links have increased subjective to prove acts of barbarism. All of which does nothing 
but give to increased personal vendettas, family or militia groups. In summa the war 
then is being waged not between distinct sides, but in areas of common interchange 
between armed actors and the civilian population. 
Consequently, these exchanges are an irregular cycle of violence that affects social 
relations, from shock phenomena and micro force (the cases of personal revenge) to the 
rivalry between irregular armies. We study and prototype for a conflict whose 
dimensions, although heterogeneous understand aspects in detail, corresponding to a 
structured set in the interaction of disparate violence
40
. 
In wartime, the complaint can not only give benefits, also carries much risks and 
dangers. Those who share information and rumor, the complainants are willing to 
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 “Estado Mínimo, Agencias de Protección y Control Territorial”, en Revista Análisis Político, Número 
56,IEPRI, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Enero – Abril de 2006, pp. 115 – 131. 
39
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40
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denounce their neighbors, provided the benefit of this action outweighs the costs 
involved there. 
When the city acts on the informant has the relative advantages that gives anonymity, be 
aware of political and military goals, disguise your identity can be very problematic. 
The mobility and changing identity plays into the strategies that have armed groups to 
gather information. Not so in small towns, where the recognition of familiar people, 
know little quarrels, squabbles and differences between families, and so on. Whose 
complaint in a small social environment, is exposed to the next retaliation by those 
affected.  
Keep this interpretation of the conflict at the local level involves several tasks: (a) find 
territorial movements of clusters (b) Study of asymmetries in the mechanisms of 
information between people and agents of violence (c) analyze the strategic trade 
rational (d) Develop a mapping as detailed as possible about the relationship between 
the different discourses of conflict (e) structuring based on the foregoing, a foresight on 
the developments between conflict and political economy in Colombia. 
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